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EVIDENCE OF PRICES IN PENNSYLVANIA
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
By THOMAS J. DEMPSEY*
INTRODUCTION
N eminent domain proceedings, the courts of most jurisdictions regard
evidence of the recent selling prices of properties similar to, and in the
same neighborhood as, the property affected as being of material assistance
to the trier of facts in determining the fair market value of the property
taken or injured.' The minority rule which prohibits such evidence as going
toward value has been termed the "Pennsylvania rule." ' The classification
of Pennsylvania as titular head of the minority is reason enough to examine
its rule and the cases which have developed it,' But, in addition, there have
been protestations, private and public, from both the legal and appraising
professions calling for a reexamination and revision of the Pennsylvania doc-
trine.4  A typical expression of discontent on the part of the professions was
voiced as follows:
"One conclusion of those present was that rules of evidence exist in many
states which so limit an appraiser on the witness stand that he cannot in fact
demonstrate his competence, or lack of it. Where the witness is limited to an
expression of opinion and not allowed to explain the basis on which it rests, a
a highly qualified and skilled expert appears to the judge and the jury little
different from a complete nonentity." 5
Unfortunately, Pennsylvania may well be one of the states to which ref-
erence is made. For these reasons, it seems important, especially in these
times when marty have the power of condemnation and all who have it use
* A.B., University of Pittsburgh, 1949; L.L.B., University of Pittsburgh Law School, 1951;
Assistant County Solicitor, Allegheny County; former Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania; member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Courts of
Allegheny County; member of the American, Pennsylvania and Allegheny County' Bar Associations.
1 20 AM. JUR., Evidence § 376 (1939); 5 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 21.3 (3d ed. 1952);
1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 137 (2d ed. 1953) (hereafter cited as ORGEL).
2 20 AM. JUR., Evidence § 376 (1939); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 869 (1939).
3 Legal periodicals issuing from Pennsylvania sources have largely ignored this problem. As
bearing in some degree on the question see: Haig, The Law of Eminent Domain in Pennsylvania,
30 AM. L. REG. (m.s.) 449 (1891); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 827 (1955); Graubart, Theory
Versus Practice In The Trial Of Condemnation Cases, 26 PENN. B. A. Q., No. 1, page 36 (Oct.
1954); Lewis, Eminent Domain in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 p. 1.
4 See, e.g., Grausart, op. cit. supra note 3.
5 Preface, The Appraiser's job in Eminent Domain Proceedings, Bureau of Business Research,
University of Pittsburgh School of Business Administration (1957).
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it, to review the Pennsylvania rules with regard to the admissibility in eminent
domain proceedings of sales price evidence.
The simplest and most direct, if somewhat burdensome, way to do this
is to consider the cases in the same order as they were decided, dividing them,
however, into two logically distinguishable groups: those cases involving the
selling prices of similar properties and those cases involving the selling price
of the very property in question. History and experience, refusing to be logi-
cally compartmentalized, require the addition of a third related group: tax
assessment and miscellaneous cases.
Because the Pennsylvania appellate courts first had before them questions
involving the selling prices of similar properties, that group may aptly be
discussed first.
I. SIMILAR PROPERTY SALES
Hays v. Risher6 involved a proceeding under the lateral railroad act.
Risher, as the statute allowed, laid out a route from his mine over the inter-
vening land of Hays to the bank of the Monongahela River. At the trial to
fix the damages occasioned to Hays' land by this action, Hays proposed to
prove by one of his own witnesses the price usually paid for such rights of
way under like circumstances. This offer was made for the purpose of show-
ing the actual market value of the right claimed by Risher. The trial court's
order sustaining Risher's objection to this offer was affirmed on appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court saying, "And the question of damages was a
positive and not a comparative one. The plaintiff was entitled to receive
what would repair his estate, not what was usually paid for similar privileges."
Here was the germ of the Pennsylvania rule as it was to develop. But
note that this actually falls into that class of cases known as "transactions
with the condemnor" cases since, by virtue of the act, Risher was exercising
a delegated power of eminent domain, and it can safely be assumed that the
prices which Hays wished to introduce were paid by other such 'condemnors."
Further, Hays did not offer to show the fair market value of his own prop-
erty before or after the appropriation, but only the price paid to acquire an
easement.
The location of a railroad gave rise to Searle v. The Lackawanna and
Bloomsburg Railroad Company.7 Though the case did not involve a sale
632 Pa. 169 (1858).
, 33 Pa. 57 (1859).
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price question, the Court through Chief Justice Lowrie paid its respects to
French law with a dictum at page 64:
"On the subject of taking land for public uses, the French have a very
carefully prepared system in their law of 8 March 1810, sur les expropriations
pour cause d'utilit publique; and it directs the market value to be ascertained
by reference to recent actual sales in the neighborhood, by the tax-lists and
other documents, with the aid, if necessary, of experts, or persons whose business
it is to deal in such values: Art. 16, 17."
Two years later, the laws of France having been either forgotten or
rejected, the Court established in the leading case of East Pennsylvania Rail-
road v. Hiester8 the doctrine that evidence of similar sales prices is not admis-
sible on direct examination. Counsel for Hiester had been allowed, over ob-
jection by the defendant, to show through two of plaintiff's witnesses the prices
at which several properties had sold in the local area prior to the appropriation
of part of plaintiff's land for railroad -purposes. The witnesses described the
location and condition of the properties sold and compared them to Hiester's
land. One of the witnesses was the former owner of a tract sold and the
other, in at least one instance, had his knowledge of the sale price directly
from the purchaser. One of the sales mentioned was made in a settlement
with another railroad. In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff the Court
gave two reasons, the first of which was expressed by Thompson, J. in the
following language:
"We cannot hesitate to say that this evidence was improper, and should
not have been received. The hearsay portion of it was not objected, specifi-
cally, and had there not been a graver error in the admission of the answer
in other particulars, it would scarcely have been worth noticing; as it stood,
it was erroneous under the objection made. The subject of inquiry before
the jury was, to find the value of the plaintiff's land per acre, and especially
that portion of it taken by the defendants. This was to be ascertained by the
application of certain tests: its value as estimated by witnesses, in view of its
location, productiveness, or other uses, not speculative, or by the market value,
or, more properly, the selling price of land in the neighborhood. This last
test was approved in Searle v. Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Railroad Com-
pany, 9 Casey 57; and it is there said that sometimes the value cannot be
ascertained in any other way. There can certainly be no objection to this test,
but the evidence received went far beyond it. It did not pretend to fix the
market value of the land, but assumed to ascertain it by the special, and, it
may be, exceptional cases named. This will not do, for, if allowed, each
special instance adduced on the one side must be permitted to be assailed,
and its merits investigated on the other; and thus there would be as many
branching issues as instances, which, if numerous, would prolong the contest
interminably."
840 Pa. 53 (1861).
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In short, this reason is that collateral issues would be introduced by such
evidence which might unduly prolong the trial. The Court's second reason
was then stated as follows:
"But even this is not the most serious objection. Such testimony does
not disclose the public and general estimate which, in such cases, we have
seen is a test of value. It would be as liable to be the result of fancy, caprice,
or folly, as of sound judgment, in regard to the intrinsic worth of the subject
matter of it; and, consequently, would prove nothing on the point to be in-
vestigated. The fact as to what one may have sold or received for his prop-
erty, is certainly a collateral fact to an issue, involving what another should
receive, and, if no way connected with it, proves nothing. It is, therefore,
irrelevant, improper, and dangerous. Not so with a market value. That
is a recognized fair test. It holds good, let the demand and supply be as
they may, and is equally reliable, whatever may be the relative value of
money and property, or the circumstances of the country. It is supposed
to represent the judgment of the community, and approximately fixes the
value of a given article or thing, as it may do the character of a person."
Essentially, what the Court has said here is that proof of the selling price
of particular sales is not relevant to prove general market value which is held
to be the true test of value.
These two grounds must be considered in further detail. First, however,
it should be pointed out that later in its opinion in this case the Court remarked,
"The question might be proper by way of cross-examination to test the ac-
curacy of the witness, but not otherwise." This statement is the foundation
for the Pennsylvania rule that an expert witness may, under certain circum-
stances, be required to state the prices at which similar properties sold, not
for the purpose of proving or tending to prove value, but for the purposel
of impeaching his credibility.
Returning to the first reason given for the decision in the Hiester case,
it is appropriate to note at length a discussion in Wigmore on Evidence which
utilizes an extensive quotation from the Hiester case.
An appreciation of Wigmore's principles of Relevancy and of Auxiliary
Probative Policy is a pre-requisite to understanding the passage. Discussing
the question of the admissibility of evidence of a thing's capacity or tendency
to produce an effect found attending the same thing elsewhere Wigmore
points out 9 that the admissibility of a given piece of such evidence will be
determined by the principles of Relevancy, and of Auxiliary Probative Policy.
The former requires that the circumstances under which the other conduct
occurs should be substantially similar. The latter principle allows the exclu-
9 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 459 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE).
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sion of relevant evidence, wherever it would, in the case in hand, involve an
unfair surprise,' ° an undue prejudice, or a disproportionate confusion of issues
and a waste of time. Elsewhere,11 the text writer indicates in answer to the
Confusion of Issues Argument that the confusion is usually no greater than
that which occurs in the trial of other matters, and that, in those instances
where the disadvantage of confusion on a minor issue becomes real and marked,
without compensating advantage from useful evidence, it is unnecessary to
take the radical step of excluding all such evidence by universal rule when
by the simple expedient of leaving it to the trial court to draw a line of exclu-
sion wherever the evil of confusion of issues impends, a more sensible solution
may be reached. Wigmore explains:
"The whole objection in question is mainly (as Mr. Justice Holmes has
neatly put it [citing Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 28, 11 N. E. 938] )
'a purely practical one, a concession to the shortness of life'; and it would
be unworthy of the genius of our law if Courts should feel obliged to lay
down a hard and fast rule of exclusion when such a simple expedient was
at hand for preventing the supposed disadvantages."
Immediately following,"2 Wigmore suggests that the true solution of the
conflicting considerations is that evidence of this sort, when relevant, should
be admitted unless in the discretion of the trial court it seems to involve a
serious inconvenience by way of unfair surprise or confusion of issues.
Wigmore takes up the present problem in section 463, p. 504, where he
says:
... [T]his question is usually presented in the form, whether a sale
of other property is admissible as evidence of the value of the property in
question.
"In answering this question, it is found that the two leading principles
already expounded come into joint application,-the principle of Relevancy
and the principle of Auxiliary Policy. . . . According to the former, the
value or sale-price of the other property is relevant only when the property
is substantially similar in conditions,' according to the second, it may be
excluded, though relevant, if it involves in the case in hand a dispropor-
tionate confusion of issues and loss of time.
"The latter consideration has weighed so much with a few Courts
that they have treated it as requiring the absolute and invariable exclusion
of such evidence.
1ONew York, formerly a minority state, joined the majority through legislation. See, e.g.,
N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 318a. These acts provide a notice procedure whereby the adversary must be
made aware of the sales intended to be relied on, thus eliminating the surprise element. For a dis-
cussion of these acts and the problem generally see Legislation Note, Evidence of Sales In Condemna.
lion Proceedings, 32 COLUm. L. REv. 1053 (1932).
11 2 WIGMORE 443.
12 2 WIGMORE 444.
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"It is enough to note (1) in answer to the argument from Relevancy,
that since value is a money-estimate of a marketable article possessing certain
definable qualities, the value of other marketable articles possessing substan-
tially similar qualities is strongly evidential and is so treated in commercial
life, all the argument and protestation conceivable cannot alter the fact that
the commercial world perceives and acts on this relevancy; (2) in answer
to the argument for Auxiliary Probative Policy, it may be noted that this ob-
jection may or may not exist in a given instance, and that the rational and
practical way of meeting it is to allow the trial Court in its discretion to
exclude such evidence when it does involve a confusion of issues, but other-
wise to receive it. ..
"Except in a few jurisdictions, this class of evidence is received.
... In some jurisdictions its use is limited to the testing of value-
witnesses on cross-examinaiton. Even in the jurisdictions where it is rejected,
its force is so far recognized that numerous absurd quibbles become necessary
in order to distinguish between that which is rejected and that of which
common sense compels a hearing."
In commenting on the Hiester case, Orgel observes that the Court, in rul-
ing out the evidence of sales prices did not rely solely on the "collateral issues"
argument but "went further and even questioned the relevancy of evidence
of sales." 18 This point was keenly grasped in United States v. Certain Parcels
of Land in City of Philadelphia." In that case, heard by two Circuit Judges
and a District Judge, the only question before the court was whether, in a case
to determine the value of property taken by the United States under the power
of eminent domain, a written contract for the sale of the identical property,
executed shortly before the taking, is admissible in evidence as bearing on the
market value of the property. The trial court had refused to receive the
contract when offered in evidence by the owner of the property. In reversing
the lower court, it was held that federal law controlled on the question of
admissibility and that under federal law the contract was proper evidence.
The case had been tried in the court below on the theory that Pennsylvania
law applied on evidentiary questions and District Judge Bard, who wrote the
opinion for the Circuit Court availed himself of the opportunity to review the
Pennsylvania rules and particularly the import of the Hiester case and Penn-
sylvania's market value definition as expressed in that and subsequent cases.
His conclusion was that Pennsylvania law would not admit the evidence.
This was based on the following reasoning:
"It has long been settled in Pennsylvania that evidence of the sale
price of lands similar to the parcel condemned is inadmissible . The
18 1 ORGEL 143.
14 144 F.2d 626 (3rd Cir. 1944).
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principle reason upon which this rule is based is significant because it is broad
enough to be equally applicable to evidence of sales of the very property
condemned. This reason is that 'market value' in this type of case in Penn-
sylvania depends on 'judgment of the community' rather than that of a par-
ticular buyer and seller."
Later, Judge Bard compared the federal and Pennsylvania standards as he
saw the latter revealed by the early cases:
"Under the concept of market value [i. e., what it fairly may be believed
that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given], set forth by
the Supreme Court [of the United States] as the 'practical standard' by
which the constitutional requirement of just compensation to the owner
of the land taken by the United States for public use is determined, it
would certainly appear that evidence of the sales price of the land in question
is relevant and admissible. . . . And if market value, as construed in con-
demnation proceedings by the United States is 'what a willing buyer would
pay in cash to a willing seller,' evidence of what the property sold for in
a bona fide sale is most significant. Indeed, substantially the same definition
of market value has been adopted by the Pennsylvania Courts in tax assess-
ment cases in which, as pointed out above, evidence of the sales price is
recognized to be admissible and to have a substantial bearing on market
value. It will thus be seen that it is a difference in the definition of the
term 'market value' in condemnation proceedings, and not merely a difference
in the procedure by which the elements of a commonly defined standard are
proved, which renders evidence of the sale price relevant and admissible
in condemnation proceedings in the federal courts and irrelevant and in-
admissible in condemnation proceedings in the Pennsylvania court."
The holding of East Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hiester still rules in emi-
nent domain similar property sales cases today.l"
The next case to come before the Court was Pittsburgh, Virginia and
Charleston Railroad Co. v. Rose 6 where counsel for the defendant had re-
quested the lower court to charge ". . . that the best evidence of market value
is the price actually paid for land in that neighborhood, making due allowance
for difference in position and improvements." In affirming the lower court's
refusal to so charge, Sharswood, J. said for the court:
"The selling price of land in the neighborhood is undoubtedly a test
of the value. But that is very different from the price paid for any par-
ticular property or properties. The true test is the opinion of witnesses in
view of location, productiveness and the general selling price in the vicinity.
Market value depends upon the judgment of the community, and a considera-
tion of part lcular sales would lead to collateral issues as numerous as the sales."
15 Pennsylvania & N.Y.R.R. and Canal v. Bunnell, 81 Pa. 414 (1876); Gorgas v. Philadelphia,
Hbg. & Pgh. R.R., 215 Pa. 501, 64 A. 680 (1906); Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593, 80 A. 1113
(1911).
t674 Pa. 362, 369 (1873).
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In Hays v. Briggs17 the trial court had permitted the defendant in the
issue framed to prove prices and the rate of increase in value of the similar
properties from the time of the sales to the time of this appropriation. At
least one of the "similar transactions," the "price" of which was introduced,
was a viewers' award. Defendant's evidence was submitted to show the value
of the proposed landing at the time Briggs sought to acquire it. In reversing
the judgment the Court expressed the view that, in addition to being repugnant
to the Hiester and Rose decisions, the transactions were too remote in time
and, of course, one was actually a viewers' award.
One must admire counsel for the defendant in Pittsburgh & Western
Railroad Company v. Patterson.18 He massed a frontal assault on the doctrine
of the Hiester case by proposing to show by a witness in his case in chief:
. . . [TJhat about and since the date of the location of the railroad,
sales of river fronts in the vicinity of the Patterson property have been
made, each having landing and mainland facilities equal to those of the
Patterson landing, and the prices at which said sales were made. This in
connection with other testimony in the case for the purpose of showing the
value of the Patterson landing, and like landings in the vicinity."
Rebuffed by the court below, this daring warrior approached the Supreme
Court. His argument had been summarized by the reporter of the case:
"Sales of property, whether real or personal, fix the market value of
similar property for the time being; all business men regard such sales as
a test and criterion, and it seems against reason to exclude evidence of such
sales in a legal proceeding, the very object of which is to ascertain market
value as a measure of damages. Many authorities recognize the propriety
of such evidence, subject only to proper qualifications of similarity in character
and situation of the properties, and as to time of sale, etc. Our offer was
fully up to the required standard in these particulars."
The Court was unimpressed by the authorities from other jurisdictions
and texts that were cited by defendant and held that the law of Pennsylvania
was well settled (as indeed it was) contrary to defendant's position. In defeat,
counsel for the defendant might well have mused that he was beaten, not by
the sword of any tangible foe, but by a spectral, elusive image-possibly a
myth-the general selling price, the judgment of the community.
The limitations on sales price testimony on direct examination which still
persist today are exemplified by the repwrter's notes of the lower court's ruling
on defendant's offer:
"We understand tle Supreme Court to have ruled that particular sales
and the prices at which they have been made cannot be given in evidence,
1" 74 Pa. 373 (1873).
.18 107 Pa. 461, 462 (1884).
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and for that reason we sustain the objection. We will, however, allow the
witness to testify that he has knowledge of particular sales in the neighbor-
hood, and that he knows the prices, in order to show his knowledge of
values, bu~t not to give the prices at which the sales were made. He can
simply testify to the fact that he knows of the sales and knows the prices."
The mystic quality of the term "general selling price" is further revealed
by dicta in Pittsburgh, Virginia and Charleston Railway Co. v. Vance," as
follows:
"The general selling price of lands in the neighborhood cannot be shown
by evidence of particular sales of alleged similar properties; it is a price fixed
in the mind of the witness from a knowledge of what lands are generally
held at for sale, and at which they are sometimes actually sold, bona fide, in
the neighborhood."
In the Ziemer case2 0 the Court affirmed rejection of an offer by the de-
fendant railroad to prove what had been paid by it to other property owners
along the same street for the privilege of laying their tracks upon it. The
rationale of the decision was that the other purchases had been made by way
of settlement or compromise. But the Court went further and said:
"Aside from this, to render such testimony of any value the conditions
must be shown to have been similar. This would involve as many issues
before the jury as there were persons who had been settled with." 21
The first eminent domain case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had before it: an instance of testimony of prices on cross-examination was
Schuylkill Rizer, etc. R. Co. v. Stocker.2 There the plaintiff in cross-examining
one of the defendant's witnesses asked a series of questions which elicted
from an unskilled, innocent or honest witness information that a particular
property, as to which the witness had made inquiry, was being held for sale
at $5,000 an acre. This value per acre was identical with the testimony of
one of the plaintiff's witnesses as to the value of plaintiff's land and was far
higher than other of defendant's witnesses calculated the worth of the subject
property.
In charging the jury the trial court made reference to the testimony of
this witness:
"If he has correctly represented the value of that property, then you
may think that the value of this property would be larger than that put upon
it by some of the defendant's witnesses."
19 115 Pa. 325, 8 Atd. 746 (1886).
20 Pennsylvania Schuykill Valley R.R. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa. 560, 7 At]. 187 (1889).
21 Accord, Pennsylvania Schuylkill R.R. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 Atd. 468 (1889), reversing
a ruling permitting asking prices of lots in neighborhood to be shown where thy tract in question
was undivided meadowland.
22 128 Pa. 23 , 18 Atl. 399 (1889).
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The defendant charged on appeal that this instruction was error; that it
was a direction to the jury that the value of the similar property, as testified
to by the witness, should affect the estimate by the jury of the value of the
Stocker farm.
The Court dismissed this assignment of error (but reversed on other
grounds) saying of the phraseology complained of:
"It was a mere passing observation as to what the jury might think,
not a suggestion that they should think in any particular way on the subject
referred to."
The cross-examining of valuation witnesses as to prices at which similar
lands sold was done in Curtin v. Nittany V. R. Co.2" by defendant of plain-
tiff's witnesses. 'The interrogatories developed that an adjoining tract had been
sold at a public sale within two years for $50 an acre and that a small piece
of another farm had sold at $200 per acre. The court charged the jury in part:
"Wherever it [market value] can be ascertained by public sales of
lands adjoining, the market value may be ascertained in that manner; where
there have been no public sales, the market value must be ascertained from
the knowledge and judgment of men who are acquainted with the property,
and who by their experience and judgment can give the jury a fair, honest,
and impartial opinion as to the real value of the property."
Counsel for the defendant appealed the judgment for plaintiff arguing
that this portion of the charge allowed the jury to consider as being of the
highest importance evidence of particular sales which evidence, he stated, is
utterly inadmissible. Held: the trial court did not violate the established
Pennsylvania rule, that the defendant itself is solely responsible for the evi-
dence complained of, and that the general tenor of the charge indicates that
the reference was to the general selling price in the neighborhood, and not
to any particular sales.
The charge of the court as related to selling prices was again before the
Supreme Court in Becker v. The Philadelphia & Reading Terminal Railroad
Company.4 Green, J. restated the Pennsylvania rule that market value as a
measure of damages cannot be ascertained by evidence of particular sales of
other property alleged to be situated similarly to the one in question. Such
evidence, the Court said, would introduce collateral issues. Then the Court
added, "Of course such evidence may be brought out by the cross-examination of
witnesses."
23 135 Pa. 20, 19 At. 740 (1890).
24 177 Pa. 252, 35 Atl. 617 (1896).
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As testimony of the general selling price of similar properties in the
vicinity, but not of particular sales, is permissible to prove market value, so
testimony that the property taken was of a kind which owners in the vicinity
were glad to get rid of and permitted to be taken away without cost is proper
to prove the non-existence of market value. Such was the decision in The
Morris and Essex Mutual Coal Company v. Delaware, Lackawanna and West-
ern Railroad Company.5 The defendant had removed culm from plaintiff's
land and on the basis of the type of testimony indicated recovered a verdict
and judgmen: in its favor. The following excerpt shows the reasoning of
the Court in affirming on plaintiff's appeal:
"That culm . . . was given away by the owners with a desire to get rid
of it, was illustrative and confirmatory of the assertion that it had no market
value. A single instance, it is true, would not be enough, as a particular
sale of land is not evidence of the market value of other land in the same
vicinity, as it may have been compelled by necessity or have been the result
of caprice or folly: P. & W. R.R. Co. vs. Patterson 107 Pa. 461."
Henkel v. Wabash Pittsburgh Terminal Railroad Company2 is a sig-
nificant case with respect to rebutting the effect of sales price testimony where
it has been introduced 'by an adversary. The plaintiff in that case had called
to the attention of witnesses on both sides the sales of two particular prop-
erties in the immediate vicinity of the property in question. With his own
witnesses he had done this on their examination in chief. On the cross-
examination of the defendant's witness, he had shown the prices paid for
the two properties. Defendant's cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses
developed that one of them had based his opinion of the value of plaintiff's
property entirely on one of these sales, and that another witness has based
his opinion mainly if not exclusively on the two sales.
During its case defendant offered and was allowed to prove by the pur-
chasers that the sales were made under special circumstances and that the
prices were greatly in excess of the market values of the properties and were
not a criterior thereof.
The plaintiff appealed from a judgment in his favor charging as error
the admission of this testimony presented by defendant. The Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. After noting the reliance placed on the
two similar sales, Fell, J. observed, "The prices paid for these properties thus
became a standard of value of property in the vicinity."
25 190 Pa. 448, 42 At. 883 (1899).
26 213 Pa. 485, 62 Atl. 1085 (1906).
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The reasoning of the decision was explained by Mr. Justice Fell as fol-
lows:
"While particular sales may not be proved as establishing a market
value, the good faith of a witness and the accuracy and extent of his knowledge
may be tested by questioning him as to particular sales, to ascertain whether
he knew of and considered them in forming an opinion. These inquiries
go directly to the value of the opinion expressed. We see no reason why
a party against whose interest a witness has testified may not show that the
opinion expressed is valueless as evidence because it is founded on a mis-
apprehension of the facts, as that a supposed sale has never been made, or
that the consideration named was fictitious, or that the sale had been without
regard to the market value. This does not lead, as would the proof of par-
ticular sales, to the trial of collateral issues. It goes only to impair the value
of an opinion which has become evidence in the case by showing that it is
based on a misapprehension of the real facts."
Issue could easily be taken with the proposition that the allowance of
such testimony does not lead to the trial of collateral issues. It is, after all,
the same testimony as would be -presented if proof of prices were permitted
as bearing on value, but only for a different purpose. But at least the rule is
becoming more workable and even the Court admitted that the two similar
sales here involved established "a standard of value." This case presented
that class of evidence "of which," in Wigmore's phrase, "common sense com-
pels a hearing."
The railroad's attorney in Schonhardt v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company7
was not allowed by the lower court to ask the plaintiff on cross-examination
the prices at which four similar properties, two on each side of plaintiff's,
were recently sold. Since the offer had been stated by defendant's counsel to
be for the purpose of testing plaintiff's knowledge as to the values and for the
purpose of having the testimony go to the jury on the question of value, the
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling.
The doctrine of the Henkel case was severely narrowed by the decision
in the case of Neely v. Western Allegheny Railroad Co. 8 Counsel for the
defendant was allowed on cross-examination to ask the selling prices of
similar properties of which plaintiff's witnesses had knowledge. But when
he attempted to have the witnesses compare the similar properties with the
one in question, as to location and physical characteristics, plaintiff's objec-
tions were sustained. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial
judge, stating through Fell, J.:
"A witness may be asked as to particular sales to ascertain whether
he knew of and considered them in forming an opinion as to value, and it
27 216 Pa. 224, 65 At. 543 (1907).
28 219 Pa. 349, 68 At. 829 (1908).
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may be shown for the purpose of affectihg the weight of the opinion he has
given, that it is based on a misapprehension of the facts: Henkel v. Rail-
road Co., 213 Pa. 485. But to show value by comparison with other lands
or to attempt to weaken the testimony of a witness by showing that his opinion
was not based on a proper comparison of properties is open to the same
objection that excludes testimony as to particular sales."
The Henkel case facts and the Neely case facts are not truly distinguish-
able. Only different. In the former, the misapprehension sought to be shown
was as to the validity of the price paid as a fair representation of market value.
In the latter, the misapprehension intended to be demonstrated was as to the
degree of comparability of the properties. The collateral issues problem de-
cided the case.
Of the Neely decision, Wigmore says,
"[C]ross-examination allowed to particular sales, but not to particular
values; the rule of the State, being unsound to start with, now leads to
tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee distinctions." 29
In Rea v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville Railroad Company" the court was
as liberal in permitting impeaching evidence as it had been conservative in
the Neely case. Here, both plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses, in valuing
plaintiff's property, placed great weight on a neighboring property, known
as the Klondike Warehouse, and regarded it as a standard of value in the
neighborhood. The sale of this property had occurred in the same year
as the condemnation. Witnesses for each side testified to the value of the
warehouse building and the lot on which it stood separately. By assigning
a low value to the building, the plaintiff's witnesses showed a higher square
foot value on the land. Defendant's offer to prove by a building contractor
the value of the warehouse building was rejected by the lower court.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence should have been allowed and
reversed the judgment of the court below. Moschzisker, J. said for the Court,
after quoting from the Henkel decision:
"The defendant's offer to prove the fair value of the buildings at the
time of the sale was rejected, and counsel contends that had this testimony
been admitted it would have shown the improvements to have been worth
at least double the value placed on them by certain of the plaintiff's wit-
nesses; which well might have materially affected the value of the opinion
expressed by these witnesses. On this state of facts we are of opinion that
the testimony should have been received."
29 2 WIGMoiE 463, note 2 at 511.
30229 Pa. 106, 78 At. 73 (1910).
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In Burns v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company:1 the plaintiff had offered
in evidence "for the purpose of showing the consideration and what was con-
veyed" a deed from the Aspinwall Land Company to the defendant conveying
several lots of ground adjacent to the lots of plaintiff taken by the defendant,
as well as a strip of river frontage. There apparently was no objection made
to the receipt of this evidence. The defendant did, however, offer to prove
how the consideration was made up and what was paid for each of the lots
described in the deed and for the river frontage. The objection of the plain-
tiff to this evidence was sustained. On appeal by the defendant the Court
reversed the judgment. This was of course the equitable decision. What is
particularly worthy of note is the attitude of the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Mestrezat, as to the evidence of the selling prices going towards value.
The following from the opinion scarcely reflects disapproval:
"This offer [of the plaintiff] was, of course, for the purpose of showing
the price of the lots conveyed as evidence of the value of the lots taken ...
[The offer of the defendant] was not an attempt to correct or explain the
deed, but simply to explain the consideration, and to inform the jury what
was paid for each of the several lots embraced in the deed. This testimony
was necessary if the price of the lots conveyed by the Aspinwall company
was to be of service to the jury in ascertaining the value of the lots con-
demned by the defendant company."
The Burns case also held that an offer made by one not clearly shown
to be an agent of the defendant was admissible but that an offer and an unex-
ecuted settlement agreement made after the filing of the bond were not ad-
missible.
In Drexler v. Borough of Braddock32 it was held improper to ask a valu-
ation witness on cross-examination, for the purpose of impeaching his testi-
mony, whether he had not testified in an entirely unrelated condemnation case
that the property there involved -was worth $800 a front foot.
3
Because of its unclear opinion Roberts v. Philadelphia34 cannot be read
except in connection with Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia" which was de-
cided two years later. The Roberts case seems to hold that no cross-examina-
tion is permitted of a value witness with regard to the prices at which similar
properties in the same neighborhood have recently sold. Of course this doc-
trine flies in the face of all prior cases and it was therefore necessary in the
31 229 Pa. 648, 79 Atl. 125 (1911).
32 238 Pa. 376, 86 Atl. 272 (1913).
38 The Court properly considered that the witness's testimony was utterly irrelevant. The offer
of it might even be said to have been preposterous.
34 239 Pa. 339, 86 Atl. 926 (1913).
35 248 Pa. 179, 93 Atl. 937 (1915).
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Girard Trust Co. case for the court to point out that the prices inquired about
in the Roberts case were associated with sales not testified to by the witnesses.
Together these two decisions establish the rule that prices may be asked of a
valuation witness on cross-examination for the purpose of testing his credi-
bility only as to those sales which he testifies he had knowledge of and con-
sidered in forming his opinion of market value."
The following language of Moschzisker, J. in the Girard case points up
the meaning of the Roberts decision and recommends a course of conduct
which we shall see was subsequently reaffirmed by the Court:
". .. but, generally speaking, even on cross-examination, such a witness
cannot in the first instance be interrogated concerning the prices brought
at sales not relied upon by him in making his original estimate of value,
although, if he has relied on some sales in the neighborhood, he may be
asked, without mention of prices, if he knew of other sales of properties
similarly located and whether he considered them, and if not, why not; the
course which the investigation may take after that depends largely upon the
discretion of the trial judge, constantly keeping in mind the fact that the
cross-examination is merely to test the good faith and accuracy of knowledge
of the wi:ness, and that prices paid at particular sales of other properties
are not, in themselves evidence of the market value of the land in con-
troversy..."
Mr. Justice Moschzisker gave further recognition to the discretionary
powers of the trial judge in this type of case when he held on behalf of the
Court in Machesney v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville Railroad Company" that
the lower court had not committed error in refusing to allow the blanket ques-
tion, "And all of those sales were at a much less figure than the one you
mentioned, weren't they ?" The Justice pointed out that the trial judge had
permitted liberal cross-examination of several witnesses within the proper
limits ". . recently suggested by us in Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia
" It was felt that the blanket question, under the circumstances, might
have" . . . tended to confuse, rather than clarify, the case."
In 1917 another advance step was taken in Stone v. The Delaware, Lacka-
wanna and Western Railroad Company. 8  At the trial defendant had been
permitted without objection to cross-examine plaintiff's valuation witnesses
concerning sales of similar properties and the prices obtained therefor. The
court then allowed the plaintiff, on redirect examination of his witnesses, to
ask them to state the selling prices of still other similar properties in the
3 Accord, Serals v. West Chester Borough School District, 292 Pa. 134, 140 At. 632 (1928).
37 252 Pa. 225, 97 A. 397 (1916).
38 257 Pa. 456, 101 At. 813 (1917).
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neighborhood. The defendant appealed and assigned this ruling as error.
Held: the lower court did not commit error. The reasoning of the decision
is that unless such testimony is allowed the jury will not possess all the facts
upon which the witness founds his estimate of value and will not, therefore,
be in a position to properly evaluate his opinion. Speaking again of the trial
court's discretionary powers and stating the rationale of the decision, Frazer, J.
says,
"Under such circumstances when defendant questions the witness regard-
ing other sales the door for the admission of such testimony [sales prices
on redirect examination] is open. To what extent the investigation along
this line should be carried is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
judge, as was stated in Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, supra.
"A familiar rule of evidence is that where a witness testifies to part of
a transaction, the opposing party may insist upon the complete transaction
being shown, even though such evidence be otherwise inadmissible . . . and
we see no reason why that rule should not be applied in cases of this class."
We have seen the Court using, especially in the Girard Trust Co. case,
the word "base" in stating the circumstances under which a witness may be
cross-examined regarding comparable property sales prices. Another term
used is "relied on." The genius of the lawyer and of the appraiseri-witness
is such that certain of them began to indulge in semantics to avoid having to
declare before the jury for any purpose the prices at which properties, ad-
mittedly similar to the plaintiff's, had been sold. This practice continues in
spite of Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives, etc., v. Philadelphia.9 There
the lower court had protected such a witness from disclosure.4" In reversing,
Mr. Justice Kephart declared for the Court:
"The court below held that to entitle an adverse party to cross-examine,
the witness must have 'based' or' formed his judgment from a particular
sale; the real estate experts fenced with the word 'based,' deeming its use
necessary to open the door to such cross-examination as to prices paid for
land similarly situated, as indicated in Girard Trust Company, Trustee, v.
Phila., supra. Other words were used which conveyed the idea that in fixing
the value of the land in suit they depended, to some extent, on the prices
paid for other properties. Illustrative of this, witnesses state: 'I have taken
them [sales in the vicinity] 41 into consideration but I would not say that I had
based it [the value] absolutely on those sales. I have considered all of
them.' 'I considered them, I didn't rely on them absolutely.' 'That [an
adjoining property sale] assisted me. It was not the controlling factor by
which I determined my price.' 'I took into account all the sales of land in
39268 Pa. 559, 112 At. 76 (1920).
40 This is an area where the empiric method suggested by Lewis (op. cit. supra note 3, at 47)
might be utilized by appealing more cases where the witness is protected.
41 The language in brackets throughout this passage is that of Kephart, J.
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the vicinity . . .' . . . all of these statements, and others, show that the
sale prices of the neighborhood property were part of the basis upon which
the estimate of value of appellee's land was found.
"The court and the witnesses were mistaken as to the effect of our de-
cision in Girard Trust Co. v. Phila., supra. We did not intend to limit
the cross-examination to the use of a particular word; but we did intend to
place the effect of the evidence before the trial court in such position that,
if a fair investigation demanded the source of a witness's knowledge, the
court might permit the investigation; and when it appeared a witness con-
sidered-in the sense that, in his estimate of value, he was aided by, or
relied on--prices paid for properties similarly situated, he may be cross-
examined as to the prices paid for such other similar properties, as testing
his good faith, credibility, accuracy and extent of knowledge. . . . [T~he
test must be the use made by the witness of the sale price of the property
thus situated. If it did not enter into his estimate as a factor upon which
value was based, he cannot be cross-examined as to the sale price."
As to any given similar property sale there would seem to be four possi-
bilities: (1) the witness might be ignorant of the sale; (2) the witness might
know of the sale and have rejected it in toto in forming his opinion; (3) he
might have relied on the sale conclusively; or (4) he may have taken it into
account in some lesser degree than conclusively. The Pennsylvania Co., etc.,
decision allows cross-examination as to the selling price in instances (3) and
(4) but not as to instances (1) and (2). The language of the Girard case
that if a witness has stated he relied on [in the sense of "utilized"] some sales
he may be asked ". . . without mention of prices, if he knew of other sales
of properties similarly located and whether he considered them, and if not,
why not . . ." indicates trial counsel's course of action in instance (2).
Following the enunciation of the rule of the Pennsylvania Co., etc., case,
Kephart, J. reaffirmed the doctrine of the Pennsylvania court that ". . . grave
danger . . . attends the introduction of evidence of this character, as it has a
tendency to raise collateral issues as to the circumstances of each individual
sale. . " He continued, " . . but when these sales form a part of the
judgment of the witness, in fairness the opposing side should know the source
of his information."
One of the cases most frequently cited for propositions of law relating
to the admissibility of sales price evidence is McSorley v. Avalon Borough
School District."2 But all such statements in that case are dicta and adequately
appear in the discussion of the other cases in this article. The single holding
in the McSoriey case was that the replacement value of a house and garage
42291 Pa. 252, 139 At. 848 (1927).
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may not be shown in chief for the purpose of corroborating valuation wit-
nesses who have testified as to the value of the buildings apart from the value
of the land.
The phraseology of the trial court's charge was again in issue in Broomall
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.4" Both sides had cross-examined the witnesses
for the other side as to prices paid for similar properties for the purpose of
determining the witnesses' ability to appraise. On his motion for a new trial
the plaintiff complained of the following language in the instructions given
to the jury:
"In doing that [fixing the fair market value of the property before the
taking] it is only fair that you should take into consideration, in so far as
it has been testified to, all the prices which were paid for other lands in the
community when sales were made."
The lower court agreed with the plaintiff that this terminology allowed
the jury to consider the sales prices as evidence going toward value and granted
a new trial. Defendant appealed from this order and was successful in hav-
ing it reversed. The Supreme Court stated that the general import of the
charge was that the jury should only regard the general selling price in fixing
value and that the clause "in so far as it has been testified to" saved the
challenged language from error. One suspects, however, that the court thought
the case, which had been "tried and presented at length" need not be retried
on account of this one point. Other quotations from the charge, and of course
the action of the lower court itself, sustain plaintiff's argument.
Fisher v. Allegheny County44 held that a deed was not admissible for
the purpose of affecting the credibility of a valuation witness where it was not
clear that the sale referred to by the witness was the same transaction repre-
sented by the deed. It also ruled that the testimony of a witness as to a par-
ticular sale may not be allowed for the purpose of contradicting one of the
adversary's witnesses where it was not clear that the two were referring to
the same sale. In a dictum Maxey, J. states at page 476:
"If they had specifically mentioned such a sale and had given an
erroneous figure as the sale price, the trial judge should have overruled the
objection to the offer of the deed for the purposes for which it was offered."
The rule of the Henkel case as to a "misapprehension of the facts" is theh
recited.
43 296 Pa. 132, 145 Alt. 703 (1929).
44 324 Pa. 471, 188 At. 196 (1936).
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There were three rulings in Pittsburgh Terminal Warehouse and Transfer
Company v. Pittsburgh.45 First: a witness may not be asked as to the price
paid in the sale of a neighboring property during preliminary cross-examination
as to his competency to testify. Second: he may not be asked on regular
cross-examination the selling prices of similar properties where he has not
stated previously that his opinion was based on those sales. Third: the exclu-
sion of evidence in rebuttal, ordinarily admissible, by which plaintiff offered
to show that a sale mentioned by one of defendant's witnesses was for con-
venience between two corporations having the same stockholders, was not
error of sufficient practical import in a case fully and even laboriously tried
to require reversal where the witness for the defendant had not stated the
price of the sale.
No sales price question is involved in Ray v. Philadelphia" but there is
dicta by Drew, J. at page 442 which mirrors the up-grading of the initial low
estate of a "'particular sale" in Pennsylvania:
"The world is mad with opinions upon every imaginable subject, but
fortunately we only have to take those we approve. And so it is with juries;
they may reject in toto the opinion of any witness they disbelieve, and this
whether that opinion is contradicted or not.
"To illustrate, it would be difficult to get a more opposite case than
the instant one. It is impossible, or next to it, for anyone to know the dollar
and cent market value of any piece of real estate. Some think they know,
but when pressed or forced to admit that their valuation is only their opinion.
There are so many elements, so many contingencies, so many uncontrolled
factors, that enter into the market value of real estate, that nothing less than
an actual sale of the same or like property under similar conditions, can really
fortify a person to say he knows the precise market value of the property.
And even then, changes are so sudden and all conditions seldom known,
that almost invariably all.the influences which promote a sale in one case are
seldom present in another."
The last case for consideration is Berkley v. Jeannette4" which held again
that a value witness may not be cross-examined regarding the sale price of a
similar property if his testimony does not reflect that it entered into his esti-
mate as a facLor upon which value was based. Emphasis was again placed
on the discretion of the trial courts when Jones, J., now Chief Justice, said
at page 383:
"Furthermore, in prescribing the range of cross-examination, especially
where it touches collateral matter, much must be left to the sound discretion
of the trial judge..
45 330 Pa. 72, 198 At. 632 (1938).
46 344 Pa. 439, 25 A.2d 145 (1942).
47 373 Pa. 376, 96 A.2d 118 (1953).
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II. SUBJECT PROPERTY SALES
The question of the evidentiary worth of the price paid for the particular
property to be valued is distinct from the question considered in Part I of
this article. It is also simpler of solution. But the effect of the rule adopted
in the cases of similar property sales was strong enough to make an imprint
upon the decisions involving the very property in question and, as a result,
the development of a clear and logical rule in the latter type case was seriously
affected. It was not until the decision of Berger v. Public Parking Authority
of Pittsburgh,8 in 1954, that the Pennsylvania Court committed itself with
any degree of definiteness to the proposition that this type of evidence is use-
ful in fixing market value in eminent domain cases, and even there the Court
divided four to three.
The holdings prior to the Berger case are by and large compatible with
the rule there adopted. Authority and reason support it, but a considerable
amount of language was contradictory. The result has been a confused
standard. The rule is still some time away from the full maturity and virility
which it long ago ought to have attained, but at least it has emerged into the
adolescence of clarification.
Before examining the cases attention should be directed to what is
universally, or nearly universally, the rule:
"Evidence of the price at which property, the value of which is an issue,
brought bona fide at a voluntary sale at some time near the time as of which
value is to be determined is competent evidence of its value and is one of the
best and most satisfactory standards of estimating actual value, although it
is not in any case conclusive of value." 49
Of this type of evidence Nichols states:
"A price paid under such conditions is a circumstance which a prospec-
tive purchaser would seriously consider in determining what he himself
should pay for the property; as evidence before a jury it consumes little
time in introduction and raises few collateral issues, so that every argument
is in favor of its admissibility." "
The Pennsylvania cases started off well enough. The first case of this
type before the Supreme Court was East Brandywine and Waynesburg Rail-
48 380 Pa. 19, 109, A.2d 709 (1954).
4 20 AM. JUR., Evidence § 373 (1939).
50 5 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 21.2 (3rd ed. 1952).
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road Co. v. Ranck,"1 where it was held that the defendant ought to have been
allowed:
1. To ask a witness for plaintiff on cross-examination whether the
plaintiff had not sold a portion of his farm after the condemnation at a figure
which the witness had testified on direct examination was the highest value
of that portion of the farm before condemnation, and
2. To prove its offer made in chief by showing:
a. the sale,
b. an offer made by the plaintiff before condemnation to sell the
entire farm at a stated price per acre,
c. a declaration by the plaintiff before condemnation of the value
of the whole farm at a price per acre,
d. that plaintiff had offered the entire farm for sale at a public sale
before the condemnation and the prices bid on it, and
e. statements made by plaintiff shortly -before the trial to the effect
that his property had been specially benefitted and that he would
not then take a stated sum for his remaining land.
With regard to item 1: it necessarily was directed to impeaching the
credibility of the witness to whom the question was directed. The remaining
items, however, were considered by the Court to be competent as bearing on
the value of plaintiff's property. The language of the Court is not as explicit
in this regard as it might have been. For example, the thought is expressed
that the offe: by the plaintiff of his property at a fixed price and the sale of
part of it were proper facts to go to the jury as constituting his estimate of
value. This phraseology has been interpreted by some as indicating that the
offer and sale were thought 'by the Court to be in the nature of an admission. 2
Even assuming such is the correct interpretation (this is a problem which re-
occurs in a number of the subsequent cases) the evidence would go toward
value, for, as Wigmore makes clear, an admission against interest by a party
to an action has the twofold evidential effect of (1) discrediting the declarant,
as in the case of a prior self-contradiction, and (2) being of assertive testi-
monial value to prove the facts stated (or acted) in the admission.5" But
further discussion is unnecessary for even the minority opinion in the Berger
case flatly admits that the Ranck decision did admit the evidence there offered
as bearing on value.
51 78 Pa. 454 (1875).
52 See, e.g., 1 HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 78 (4th ed. 1953).
53 4 WIGMORE 1048.
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The next case to be noted is remotely associated with the present inquiry
in a negative sense. In Pennsylvania Schuylkill Valley R. Co. v. Cleary "
the Court reversed where plaintiff had been allowed to show refusals to sell
or lease to explain away the defendant's evidence that the subject property
was only used as a truck farm. Plaintiff contended it was ripe for subdivision
into lots. The theory of the court was that the views of the owner in this!
respect were not relevant in establishing what the land was worth.
In Geissinger v. Hellertown Borough " the defendant, while cross-examin-
ing the property owner, proposed to show for the purpose of testing his
knowledge of the vailue of the property, that land in the neighborhood was
worth more at the time plaintiff's predecessor in title purchased the subject
property than at the time of the appropriation. He also proposed to show
the price of that sale. Both the lower court and the Supreme Court rejected
this evidence. The time between the predecessor's purchase and the ap-
propriation does not appear. Orgel sees no logical reason for excluding
a sale by a predecessor in title, assuming the time be not too remote, though
he does admit that more practical effect will be given to the purchase by the
owner who appears before the jury as claimant."
A more important case is Reinhold v. Ephrata Borough." After testify-
ing to a before value of $4,000 and an after value of $3,225, Reinhold was
asked by his counsel upon what he based his judgment. He replied that he
had a parol contract for the sale of the land before the condemnation for
$4,000 and that he actually sold it to another after the completion of the im-
provement (the first buyer having backed out) for $3,225. Plaintiff's eight
witnesses testified to damages in the same range. The trial court charged
that if the jury believed the plaintiff, the sales were evidence to be considered
in connection with all the other testimony. The defendant, aggrieved by a
$500 verdict for plaintiff, appealed. He contended that testimony as to the
parol sale of the lot should not have gone to the jury. The Court held that
under the circumstances the evidence was not so erroneous as a matter of
law as to require a reversal. In arriving at this conclusion the Court took
into account the estimates of plaintiff's corroborating witnesses. As in other
of these early cases the opinion is of little help. The Court says, for example,
that it is important to keep in view the precise testimony and the way it was
introduced; though it belongs to a class of evidence not usually admitted on
behalf of a party himself, it would have been perfectly proper on cross-
64 125 Pa. 442, 17 At. 468 (1889).
55 133 Pa. 522, 19 At!. 412 (1890).
56 1 ORGEL 136.
57 171 Pa. 425, 33 At. 362 (1895).
[VOL. 63
EMINENT DOMAIN
examination. The significance of such statements is moot. One must rely
on what the court actually did. This decision allowed the jury, in arriving
*at the value of the property condemned, to consider evidence of a parol
sale and a post-appropriation sale (apparently not challenged).
The Eas, Brandywine and Waynesburg R. R. Co. case was followed in
Houston v. Western Washington Railroad Co.,5" where the defendant called
plaintiff as-for-cross-examination and offered to show the price at which
the plaintiff optioned his land a short time before the location of the railroad
and the price at which he sold a large tract of it shortly after the road had
been located but before its completion. The purpose of the proof was to
give the jury the plaintiff's own estimate of value of the land on the dates
of the options. The proof was to be followed by testimony showing that
the increase price was a direct result of the location of the railroad. The
defendant also offered the deed for the sale after location. Mestrezat, J.,
held for the Court that the evidence offered should have been allowed for
the reason that the declarations or acts of a party showing his estimate of
the value of his property at or about the time it is taken are evidence to his
prejudice in eminent domain proceedings.
Prior to the condemnation of his property by the Pittsburgh, Carnegie
& Western Railroad Company, Kaufman wrote a letter to the railroad offer-
ing to sell his property to it or a competitor, whichever met his price of $600
a front foot. His letter indicated he had previously made a similar offer
and that he considered the price reasonable. There was no expression or
implication in it of a compromise. At the trial of the case " the defendant
was allowed to introduce the letter into evidence. In rebuttal plaintiff testified
that the letter was written in the course of negotiations "to sell" (not "to
compromise") the property to the railroad. Plaintiff appealed, assigning
the admission of the letter as error Held: owners of property are bound
by declarations as to value or offers to sell at a specified price at or about
the time of the taking, and that, in this case, plaintiff had failed to show the
declaration was made by way of compromise. The Court cited no authority
but had been referred by the defendant to the Ranck and Houston cases.6"
Davis v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co."' is the first eminent domain case
in which the defendant was not allowed to show the purchase price paid for
58 204 Pa. 321, 54 Atl. 166 (1903).,
59 Kaufman v. Pittsburg, Carnegie & Western R.R., 210 Pa. 440, 60 Atd. 2 (1904).
60 No attempt has been made in this article to treat exhaustively of cases concerning offers, op.
tions, leases, rentals or compromise negotiations. Only those closely related to and shedding light
on the principal subject have been discussed.
61 215 Pa. 5131, 64 Atl. 774 (1906).
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the property by the owner at the time of the appropriation. In this instance
the farm had been bought seventeen years before the entry. The Court said
that such evidence would have given the jury no proper estimate of its value,
"immediately before the taking." Note the Court did not say that the pur-
chase price, was inadmissible per se. This is a remoteness of time case.
A comparison with the similar property sales rule first appeared in Rea
v. Pittsburgh and Connellsville R. R. Co.,62 decided in 1910. The condemna-
tion occurred in 1903 and the property had been purchased in 1900 by Henry
Rea, Jr. for $140,000. At the trial, Henry B. Rea, the son and executor of
the then deceased purchaser, testified as one of the claimants to a market
value of $1,056,000. On cross-examination he was asked what he or his
father had paid for the property. Objection sustained. Defendant then
offered to show by the witness on the stand, for the purpose of testing the
credibility of his testimony and the competency of his knowledge as to the
value of this property at the time of the taking, that his father had purchased
the property in 1900, that the seller had it upon the market for a number of
years and was able to hold it until the fair market value was realized, the
price at which it was sold and that there was no increase in the market value
as was indicated by the witness's testimony between the time of the sale
and the appropriation. An objection to this offer was also sustained. During
its case in chief the defendant called the same witness and made substantially
the same offer, this time for the purpose of giving to the jury information
tending to show the market value of the property when condemned. Plain-
tiff's objection to this offer was again sustained.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "the offers as a whole were
properly refused. They contain too many points collateral to the main one
sought to be proved, and the proffered evidence was not part of the defendant's
case in chief."
But it was also held that the question asked of Rea about the purchase
price was, under the peculiar facts of the case, proper cross-examination and
should have been admitted.
No more is said regarding the offers than appears above. The rejection
of the first resulted as much from the matter it contained being properly
provable in defendant's (and not plaintiff's) case as for any other reason.
The refusal to allow the second appears to be a holding against the admissi-
bility of the purchase price as going toward value, for this offer was made
62229 Pa. 106, 78 Atd. 73 (1910).
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for that express purpose during the defendant's case. But this is not
at all certain. The Court, in the course of its opinion by Moschzisker, J., said:
"In many jurisdictions evidence of this character is considered directly
pertinent on the question of value ... [citing numerous cases] ...But it is
not necessary to go so far in the present case, for the defendant here sought
to have the testimony admitted as proper cross-examination."
The safer course is to consider that the Court refrained from deciding
the issue. Though it is not entitled to any weight in resolving this aspect of
the case, it is interesting to note that the Court nowhere mentioned the different
purpose of the second offer.
On the issue of cross-examining as to purchase price the Court limited
its admissibility to its impeachment effect, saying:
...and so under the circumstances of this case, while the testimony
sought to be elicited by the question propounded to the claimant concerning
the price paid for the land would not fix the value of the property, it would
be some evidence to be considered in weighing his opinion as to its value .. "
In arriving at its decision on the propriety of the question asked on cross-
examination the Court in turn: (1) quoted Davis v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. to the effect that the greatest latitude should be allowed on cross-ex-
amination to permit every pertinent question which will enable the jury to
place a fair estimate of the weight to be given the testimony as to damages;
(2) reviewed the Pennsylvania cases relating to the admissibility of the prices
at which properties in the neighborhood had sold and concluded that since
a claimant who has expressed an opinion on the value of his own property
may be asked concerning sales of other properties in the neighborhood to
test his good faith, that he ought to be able to be asked concerning the sale
of his own property, provided the sale in question is not too remote from the
date of appropriation; (3) argued that surely in a case like the present where,
according to the plaintiff, there is a 650o increase in two years and eight
months, such an inquiry is relevant to test his "good faith," subject, of course,
to his right to prove any relevant explanatory facts; (4) found nothing in
the law that prohibited the question; (5) said of the Ranck case that the
fact that the plaintiff there had offered to sell his farm at a certain price did
not fix its value, 'but under the circumstances of that case was viewed as
some evidence to go to the jury; and (6) set forth the following standard:
"Where such testimony is offered the question of its acceptance or rejec-
tion will necessarily depend upon the circumstances in each particular case,
the disparity between the price paid and the value claimed, the length of
time between the sale and the appropriation, and other elements which may
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present themselves tending to show the worth of the testimony as evidence
affecting the importance, and throwing light upon the accuracy and good
faith, of the opinion expressed by the witness. Therefore, the question will
always be one for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge.
But in the present case the record indicates that the trial judge did not reject
the testimony in the exercise of such discretion, but rather because he con-
sidered it not proper cross-examination. We are of opinion that it was proper
cross-examination and should have been admitted."
The case of Miller v. Western Allegheny Railroad Company " is not a
sales price case. However, the Superior Court used the language of those
decisions in arriving at its own decision. Plaintiff's land contained coal de-
posits. In an appeal from a viewers' award he was asked and required to
state on cross-examination the price at which he succeeded in selling his coal.
It was held that the question was improper for the reason that particular sales
are not "evidence of the general market value with which alone juries are
to deal in cases like the one before us." Obviously, this was a case involving
a sale of a products of the property and not of the property itself.
Soisson v. Connellsville School District 64 is of little if any value. In
a short, per curiam opinion the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the
assignments of error not calling for discussion, in a case where the defendant
was not permitted to show the price plaintiffs had paid for the land in question
more than four years before the condemnation.
The shoe was on the other foot in Leaf v. Pennsylvania Co. 5 There it
was the plaintiff who attempted to cross-examine one of the defendant's
witnesses as to the price paid some time previously for a part of the same
piece of land by the same company. The attempt was made when the witness
was being examined preliminarily to test his competency. It was held that
such evidence was not admissible during the preliminary examination. The
Court went on to say that if the question had been asked after competency
was established and an estimate of value given there was nothing on the
record to justify the cross-examination and that the sale price in no way aided,
nor was it a factor in this witness's estimate of value. The court made a
reference to the then very recent case of Pennsylvania Company, etc., v. Phila-
delphia,6" a comparable property sales case which held that a valuation wit-
ness may be cross-examined as to the price of a sale only after he says that
he considered the sale in arriving at his opinion.
63 47 Pa. Super. 613 (1911).
4 262 Pa. 80, 104 Atd. 892 (1918).
:5 268 Pa. 579, 112 Atd. 243 (1920).
68268 Pa. 559, 112 At. 76 (1920).
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The precise holding of the important case of Greenfield v. Philadelphia"7
is that a property owner who testifies in his own case, even though he does
not testify to value, may be cross-examined as to the price he paid for his
property if the purchase is not too remote from the appropriation. The reason
9 given for this rule is that a party to an action who offers himself as a witness
£ does so as to all relevant matters so long as they are not properly matters
of defense or would not unduly confuse the jury if brought out at that point.
The information elicited here was not strictly a matter of defense but was as
to a fact essential to plaintiff's case.
In the opinion of Schaffer, J., certain language is used which illustrates
a changing opinion on the part of the Court with regard to the value of price
evidence when the price involved is that of the particular property in question.
For example, the Court says:
"Plaintiff in the case in hand could not conceal a most material fact,
possibly known only to him, what he had so recently paid for the property,
and leave the jury in the dark as to this most important circumstance."
Later, a statement from the Rea case is picked out and thus given emphasis:
"In commenting upon the reason for the exclusion of testimony as to
the price paid for other properties, the preseht Chief Justice, speaking for,
the court, pointed out (p. 116) : 'The objection to the admission of testimony
of particular sales is placed upon the theory that it would lead to the in-
vestigation of "collateral issues as numerous as the sales." . . . It is plain
that this does not apply to the admission of testimony concerning a single
sale of the very property in controversy.' "
And here is language which says purchase price goes to show value:
".. . it is not the fact that he has expressed such opinion [on value]
which makes the cross-examination proper . . . but that, the value of the
property at the time of the purchase being one of the main factors in question,
it is proper to probe him on the subject of the price he paid, because that
price, not too remote from the time of taking, necessarily must be a prime
subject for consideration in fixing the value of the property before the ap-
propriation."
It should be noted that these quotations formed a part of the decisions
of the court only in so far as they support the proposition that proof of value
is an integral part of plaintiff's case and not of defendant's.
Notice will be taken in Part III of this article that the opposite rule
prevails in Pennsylvania tax assessment cases. This is an anomaly beyond
67 282 Pa. 344, 127 Atd. 768 (1925).
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belief since the exact issues are involved. In the Greenfield case the following
mention is made of the tax assessment rule:
"We have very recently held in tax assessment cases, where the inquiry
is almost precisely the same as in cases such as the one we are considering,-
the fair market value of the property at a given time,-that the sale price of
the particular piece of real estate is to be taken into account by the taxing
authorities in fixing the assessment: Kaemmerling's App., 282 Pa. 78."
Westinghouse Air Brake Company v. Pittsburgh 68 involved the admissi-
bility of an option price given for the property of the plaintiff-corporation.
The president of Westinghouse had been improperly cross-examined when he
was asked whether the company did not carry the property on its books at
$1,114,067.50, with the suggestion that the reason was to avoid taxes. The
president had testified to a before value of $1,400,000.00. On re-direct ex-
amination the president was asked upon what he based his opinion and he
then referred to the option price as the basis. It was held that the question
on re-direct examination was proper after the improper assault on the witness's
testimony in chief. Mr. Justice Kephart said for the court that the option
was not submitted as evidence in chief but only in re-direct examination.
It was held not to be error to deny the defendant the right to cross-examine
the plaintiff as to the amount he paid for his property, somewhat less than a
year before the taking, where the evidence indicated that the property was
not purchased for cash but was traded in for other real estate. This decision
was Goodman v. City of Bethlehem," The Court said that since the property
was exchanged the situation would have necessitated an investigation into
the value of the other property which would undoubtedly have been confusing
to the jury.
The next case involving a purchase price was Lutz v. Allegheny County.7
rhe plaintiff appealed from a judgment in his favor and complained that he
had been indirectly cross-examined as to the cost of his property. The Supreme
Court held that there was no error committed because one of the plaintiff's
own witnesses had testified without objection to the exact sum paid. The
Court added that the plaintiff could, moreover, have been asked on cross-
examination, the direct question as to what he had paid for his property.
Greenfield v. Philadelphia was cited on this point. It should be noted that
the plaintiff had purchased the property for $9,660 and testified that it was
worth $136,314 at the time of the appropriation seven years later.
68 316 Pa. 372, 176 Atl. 13 (1934).
69 323 Pa. 58, 185 AtI. 719 (1936).
70 327 Pa. 587, 195 At. 1 (1937).
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In Berkley v. Jeannette 7 the property owner had acquired his house
and lot ten months prior to the condemnation and the adjoining vacant lot
four months before the taking. At a trial to fix the damages due plaintiff
the trial court refused to allow the plaintiff to be cross-examined regarding
the prices he paid for his property. On appeal by the defendant the ruling
of the lower court was sustained on the theory that the two properties when
merged into one undoubtedly took on an increased value. To allow cross-
examination would be to confuse the jury and it would not have served its
purpose of impeachment since the two sums when added together would
not have given a figure related to the value of the two lots as a whole.
The opinion of the Court was written by Jones, J., now Chief Justice.
After reviewing the Rea and Greenfield cases the following was deduced by
Mr. Justice Jones:
"The rule to be deduced from the Rea and Greenfield cases is that,
when an owner of property offers himself as a witness upon the trial of his
claim for damages due to a condemnation of his property or a portion of it, he
may be asked on cross-examination what he paid for the property, if his
acquisition thereof is not so remote as to deprive the purchase price of any
relevant evidentiary worth; and, that is so, whether or not he testified to the
value of his property upon direct examination. Introduction of the purchase
price is not permitted, however, in order to influence, by comparison, the
jury's determination of the property's value at the time of condemnation.
Its legally intended office is to affect the credibilty of the witness in respect
of his valuation opinion (as in the Rea case) or to impeach the integrity of
his claim (as in the Greenfield case)."
These words of Jones, J. presage his dissent in the Berger case.
Another expression of the same jurist which was to become an im-
portant part of his Berger dissent is found in Avins v. Commonwealth."2 The
Court there reversed the decision of the lower court and awarded a new
trial. In doing so Jones, J. noted defendant's contention ". . . that the trial
court erred in refusing to admit in evidence, for the purpose of impeaching
the integrity of the plaintiff's claim, the deed of conveyance by which title
to the property involved passed to the plaintiffs or their privies four years
prior to the condemnation for a consideration of $6,000." The opinion writer
declared that this question would have to await the circumstances of the new
trial but that attention should be given to Berkley v. Jeannette where the
circumstances of admissibility were spelled out, and that,
"... any question of remoteness, which can depend upon changed con-
ditions as well as elapsed time, will be a matter for the trial court to pass
upon in the exercise of its sound direction."
71 373 Pa. 376, 96 A.2d 118 (1953).
72 379 Pa. 202, 108 A.2d 788 (1954).
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As noted at the beginning of this part, the present authoritative case on
this subject is Berger v. Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh.73 The Berger
property, situated in downtown Pittsburgh, was appropriated for public use
on February 28, 1951. Berger had purchased it on June 27, 1946 and a year
later, on July 19, 1947, had entered into a written agreement to sell it to one
Speer for $36,000. The sale fell through in November of that year ap-
parently because of Speer's inability to finance the purchase. At the trial
of the condemnation case the defendant attempted to cross-examine Berger
and to examine Speer concerning the written agreement of sale dated July
19, 1947. It also offered into evidence the agreement. The trial court re-
fused to allow the defendant to cross-examine Berger or examine Speer as
to the sale, and excluded the agreement of sale.
After its motion for a new trial was denied the Authority appealed to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. There the judgment was reversed and a
new trial granted. Mr. Justice Bell wrote the opinion for the majority.
Chidsey, J. concurred in the result. Mr. Justice Jones wrote a strong and even
fervent dissenting opinion in which Stearne, J. joined. Musmanno, J. dis-
sented without comment.
Before discussing the reasons given by the majority and minority it is
necessary to observe that this was not an attempt to prove purchase price.
rhe endeavor was to show the agreement of sale made by the owner. The
two opinions of the Berger case, however, do not make a distinction between
purchase price and agreement of sale situations and couple the two in the
language used. The holding of course extends to the latter type of transaction
only.
The majority held that the defendant should have been allowed to cross-
examine Berger and to introduce the agreement of sale. They considered
the 1947 agreement of sale proper evidence for the jury on the question of
market value as well as being useful to discredit the claimant and his witnesses.
Reliance for the ruling was placed on the Ranck, Lutz, Rea, and Greenfield
cases. The position was taken that an owner may generally be asked what
he paid for the property and the price at which he offered to sell it, if the
purchase or sale was not too remote and his offer of it at a fixed price (here
consummated by an acceptance) was a fact proper to go to the jury as con-
stituting his estimate of its value. The Court quoted from the Rea case to
the effect that the objection to the admission of testimony of particular sales
is placed upon the theory that it would lead to the investigation of collateral
issues as numerous as the sales, and then laid particular stress on the state-
7 380 Pa. 19, 109 A.2d 709 (1954).
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ment of the Rea case court that, "It is plain that this does not apply to the
admission of testimony concerning a single sale of the very property in con-
:troversy." Though not expressly stated it appears certain that the agreement
of sale was in itself thought to be evidence tending to show value. The
dissent considers this to have been the decision.
The appellee's contention, that the change in the character of the neighbor-
hood and the great increase in the value of properties situated there were
sufficient grounds for entirely excluding evidence of the purchase or sale price,
was said by the Court to be completely refuted and disposed of by the Green-
field case where the same point had been made. While the owner has the
right to explain or deny or rebut evidence of purchase or sale price, and to
offer evidence of a change in the neighborhood or any increase there in property
values or any other relevant fact, this goes only to the weight of the evidence
and not to its admissibility.
Essentially two reasons formed the basis of the dissent. The first of
these reasons was that the minority conceived the general rule to be that no
evidence at all was allowed as to the purchase price paid for any particular
property or the sum at which it was offered or sold for the purpose of show-
ing value. It was considered that such evidence was admissible only in the
exceptional instance where there was a wide disparity between the price paid
or the sum offered and the value claimed for the property as of the date of
appropriation, and then only on cross-examination for the purpose of affecting
credibility. This idea can be traced back to the Rea case and was reiterated
in the case of Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives, etc. v. Phila-
delphia " where Kephart, J. speaking for the court said:
"The rejection of such evidence is largely within the discretion of the
trial court . . . which this court will not disturb unless it is manifest the
evidence should have been admitted. . . . The occasion does not arise where
the difference between the sale price and the estimate of value is such as not
to be a subject of comment or such that it may be explained, or where prop-
erties, though in the same neighborhood, are not similarly situated."
The foundation for this interpretation is based on the difficulties in-
herent in allowing collateral matter to be shown. Near the end of his opinion
Jones, J. denounces what he considers will be the effects of the majority opinion:
"Proofs of countervailing collateral matter will follow the introduction of
collateral matter; confusion of the issue on trial will be worse confounded;
and litigation over damages for land taken by condemnation will become
truly interminable."
74 268 Pa. 559, 112 Atd. 76 (1920).
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It is appropriate at this point to submit that in the majority of states
where specific sales prices and particularly purchase prices are allowed as
affirmative evidence, there is no complaint that trials are unduly prolonged;
and further that it might well be that many claims presently litigated would
be amicably settled between the condemnor and the property owner if there
was a realization that the real estate experts would be faced by properly em-
powered cross-examiners. The end of cross-examination is to test the truth.
If a sale is not a proper criterion of value a truthful and competent witness
will be able easily and forcefully to demonstrate that fact.
The second basis of the Berger dissent was that the term "remoteness"
is not limited merely to time, but that it also includes situations where a
change of circumstances has lessened the relevancy of the matter sought to
be proved. Mr. Justice Jones accuses the majority of ignoring this latter ele-
ment in its review of the trial court's exercise of discretion. While remote-
ness is undoubtedly as inclusive as he states, nonetheless it is arguable that
the weight of the evidence should be left in the hands of the jury in these
instances unless the change in circumstances was so marked or abrupt, or the
time differential was so great that the jury would be better off without
having the information.
The Berger decision is the first step in the direction of formulating a
Pennsylvania rule that will be more precise and more in accord with the rules
of other jurisdictions than was the case before it was sufbmitted."5
In the case of Young v. Upper Yoder Township School District76 the
price paid by the property owner nine and one-half years before condemna-
tion was not admitted by the lower court where there had been substantial
changes in the character of the neighborhood and where, though the court
does not take particular note of it, the plaintiff had improved other land that
he owned in the same neighborhood by erecting and selling dwelling houses.
This exclusion was affirmed in a per curiam opinion by the Supreme Court
quoting parts of the decision of the lower court. Only one of these needs
to be quoted here:
. . . it is clear especially since Berger v. Public Parking Authority of
Pittsburgh, 380 Pa. 19, that generally, whether for the purpose of testing
75 We have seen in Part I that the court in U.S. v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia,
144 F.2d 626 (3rd Cir. 1944), predicted the Pennsylvania courts would not admit a written con-
tract for the sale of the identical property involved executed before the taking. In the Berger case
such a contract was admitted. This misprediction in no way detracts from the fine analysis of the
Pennsylvania rule by the federal court. It very nearly was not allowed. Of passing interest is the
fact that one of the two Circuit Judges who comprised, with District Judge Bard, the federal court
was Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice Jones, who dissented in the Berger case. He also dissented in
the Philadelphia case but there on the sole ground that the "writing" was not an enforcible agreement
and therefore not admissible regardless which law applied or what it provided.
76383 Pa. 320, 118 A.2d 440 (1955).
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his credibility or to establish value or both, an owner may be asked on cross-
examination what he paid for the property and the price at which he offered
to sell it if purchase or sale was not too remote. . . . This is the rule elsewhere."
Peterson v. Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority77 and Simpson v. Penn-
sylvania Turnpike CommissionT each involved the question of post-appro-
priation sales. In both cases the appellate court agreed with the trial courts
that the evidence was not admissible.7" In addition, in the Simpson case there
had been an offer to prove an offering price allegedly made by the husband-
owner but promptly repudiated by the wife-owner. The court held that such
evidence was properly excluded.
The question before the Court in Braughler v. Commonwealth ° was
not one of evidence but whether the lower court had abused its discretion
in awarding a new trial after the refusal of the plaintiff to remit all of the
$6,000.00 verdict over $4,500.00. The condemnation had taken only a small
portion of a large farm purchased by the plaintiff only three months before
the appropriation for the sum of $6,000.00. None of the farm buildings
had been affected by the taking. The Court affirmed finding that the lower
court was justified in disbelieving the testimony of the property owner and
his witnesses. Mr. Justice Musmanno dissented on the grounds that a new
trial would result in an identical verdict and that the majority had ignored
the possibility that Braughler had gotten a bargain.1
In Ward v. Commonwealth82 the Court had before it the question of the
admissibility of the purchase price in what was a "forced sale" situation. The
purchase of the property by the owner at the time of condemnation had oc-
curred five years before the appropriation. The defendant attempted to ask
the plaintiff on cross-examination how much he had paid for the property.
On objection the trial court conducted a preliminary inquiry out of the hearing
of the jury and heard testimony from the plaintiff that the property was pur-
chased from a bank, then liquidating the assets of a corporation. At this
preliminary inquiry the plaintiff also testified that the value of comparable
77 383 Pa. 383, 119 A.2d 79 (1956).
78 384 Pa. 335, 121 A.2d 84 (1956).
7 This is a question ripe for further study. If pre-condemnation subject (and similar) property
sales are relevant to prove before value why are not post-condemnation sales relevant to prove after-
value in partial taking cases? Most appropriations are fixed as of an arbitrary time, e.g., the filing of
a bond, or the approval of a plan. It often takes one or more years to complete the public improve-
ment and actually see how the property has been affected so that the time differential is seldom as
bad as it seems. Earlier Pennsylvania cases have allowed consideration of post-appropriation sales:
East Brandywine & Waynesburg R.R. v. Ranck, 78 Pa. 454 (1875) for example.
80 388 Pa. 573, 131 A.2d 341 (1957).
81 The verdict in the second trial was $3,000. No. 226 June v.c.t., 1954, Court of Coin. Pleas,
Indiana County.
82 390 Pa. 526, 136 A.2d 309 (1957).
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property in the neighborhood had increased two to ten times from the date
of acquisition to the date of appropriation. There was no rebuttal of these
facts by the defendant. On the basis of these facts the trial court decided
that the sale was not a "voluntary one" and refused to allow the question.
This seems to be the first case of this kind before the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania. Their decision is in accordance with the majority of other
jurisdictions. Nichols refers to this type of case as follows:
"Even in the states in which evidence of sales of neighboring land is
admitted, it is almost universally held that a sale is not competent unless it
was voluntary on both sides; unless, in other words, it was the result of the
uncontrolled bargaining of a vendor willing but not obliged to sell with a
purchaser willing but not obliged to buy. Forced sales, such as a sale of real
estate by an administrator, a sale under a deed of trust or execution, a sheriff's
sale, or a sale upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, are not admissible, because
they do not show market value." 813
The most recent case involving the selling price of the property in ques-
tion to come before the Court was Brown & Vaughn Development Co. v.
Commonwealth. " There the claim was made by the defendant on appeal
that the trial court had disparaged the evidence of the price paid by the plain-
tiff six months prior to the condemnation to the prejudice of the Common-
wealth. There was no question as to the admissibility of such evidence. The
Supreme Court found that there was in fact no such disparagement and that,
in any event, it could not have prejudiced the defendant. It should be noted
that the deed showing the consideration was itself introduced as an exhibit.
In this case, the defendant's witnesses themselves valued the property at
considerably more than the purchase price because of the amount of develop-
ment of the property effected by the owner.
III. TAx ASSESSMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Tax Assessment Cases
A very brief reference to some non-eminent domain cases will suffice
to show that the rule in condemnation cases excluding the prices at which
similar properties have sold on direct examination and the rule as to the
admissibility of purchase prices and offers to sell of the subject property,
clouded until the Berger case in 1954, have not always been applied by the
Pennsylvania courts.
In tax assessment cases the issue is precisely the same as in land damage
cases, to wit: the value of a particular property as of a given time. In this
83 5 NICHOLS, EMINtNT DOMAIN § 21,32 (3rd ed, 1952),
84 393 Pa. 589, A.2d - ,
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type of case the Pennsylvania courts have always considered purchase price
to be of great importance and, until a 1946 decision, it would appear that the
selling prices of similar properties were also given great weight.
In Appeal of Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting
Annuities" the Supreme Court reversed the decree of the lower court on the
ground that proof of offers by the owner to sell the land in question was
rejected by the court below. In addition to this holding the Court said by
way of a dictum, "The holding price of other lands similarly situated may
be the basis of an estimate of worth." The Court also defined fair market
value at page 74 as follows:
"By fair market value is meant the amount of money which a purchaser
willing but not obliged to buy the property would pay to an owner willing
but not obliged to sell it, taking into consideration all uses to which the
property is adapted and might in reason be applied."
Note that this is the presently prevailing definition of fair market value.
Kaeminerling's Appeal 86 which was referred to in Greenfield v. Phila-
delphia 7 held that the purchase price of the property being valued was ad-
missible as bearing on market value.
This rule was followed in Sailer's Appeal"8 where the lower court was
reversed for not considering, in arriving at market value, the price paid for
the subject property. The importance of a sale of the particular property
was emphasized as follows at page 71:
but he [the witness] knew of no other sales in the neighborhood,
and, therefore, his valuation was not determined by a sale-the best criterion
of market value, but simply on his opinion, which cannot prevail in the face
of existing facts."
And again at page 72:
"The learned court below did not give us the benefit of an opinion.
Apparently he refused to accept the best test recognized of market value,
to wit: a sale, and fixed a market value which we think was not warranted
by the evidence. As in Kaemmerling's Appeal, supra (282 Pa. 78, 83),
he 'refused to consider as evidence the price paid for the property by the
purchaser...' "
The tax assessment cases have necessarily a statutory origin in that the
assessor is directed by legislative enactment to assess, rate and value all objects
85282 Pa. 69, 127 At. 441 (1925).
86 282 Pa. 78, 127 Atd. 439 (1925).
87 282 Pa. 344, 127 Atd. 768 (1925).
88 120 Pa. Super. 69, 181 Atd. 854 (1935).
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of taxation within his jurisdiction. These Acts customarily contain language
similar to the following: ". . . according to the actual value thereof, and at
such rates and prices, for which the same would separately bona fide sell."
This standard, expressed in the Act of May 15, 1841, P. L. 393, Sec. 4,89 was
involved in Sailer's Appeal. That these statutes, of which the Act of 1841
is typical, did not require the application of a different standard of value than
market value appears from a statement by Baldrige, J., on page 70, in the
opinion:
"The courts have frequently held that under this statute the assessor
is required to assess property on the basis of 'market value,' and have clearly
defined that term."
The definition of the term "market value" is then given according to the
willing seller-willing buyer test. This is the only distinction between the tax
cases and the eminent domain cases, i. e., the definition of "market value."
The willing seller-willing buyer test is undoubtedly the definition that would be
used in an eminent domain case today. 0
The use of the selling prices of similar properties has also been approved,
at least impliedly, by the Pennsylvania courts in fixing market value in tax
assessment cases.
In Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company v. Commissioners
of Northumberland County91 Barnes, J. said at page 189:
"The factors to be considered in determining the market value of coal
lands have frequently been stated by this court. Besides the prices paid in
sales of similar lands due regard must be given to the physical features of
the property to be valued."
In Hudson Coal Company's Appeal,"2 Drew, J. criticized the sales pre-
sented by the parties saying:
"The testimony offered in this case to show prices at which other lands
sold fell far short of establishing the market value of appellant's property
as of 1934. The few sales shown occurred long prior to this assessment.
89 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5101, since repealed. An identical provision is contained in the
County Assessment Law, the repealing act: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-402 (1939).
90 In Ward v. Commonwealth, 390 Pa. 526, 136 A. 2d 309 (1957), Musmanno, J. defined
market value as "the price at which a property is sold when the owner is under no compulsion to
sell and the purchaser is not for any reason forced to buy." Examples of other cases in which the
purchase price of the property involved was held to be an element of some weight in fixing market
value (though not controlling) are: Hickey's Appeal, 326 Pa. 467, 192 Atl. 923 (1937); Suermann
v. Hadley, 327 Pa. 190, 193 Atil. 645 (1937); Barry Tax Assessment Case, 353 Pa. 74, 44 A.2d 296
(1945); Liebman v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 355 Pa. 42, 48 A.2d 866 (1946); Tenth Street
Building Corporation Tax Assessment Case, 355 Pa. 226, 42 A.2d 337 (1946); Matson's Appeal,
152 Pa. Super. 424, 33 A.2d 464 (1943); York & Foster, Inc. Tax Assessment Case, 157 Pa. Super.
262, 43 A.2d 557 (1945).
91 322 Pa. 185, 186 Atl. 105 (1936).
92 327 Pa. 247, 193 At. 8 (1937).
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Two took place in 1919, when the coal industry was much more prosperous.
A more recent sale of a coal property in Luzerne County was of no help.
It did not furnish a sound basis for comparison because of differences in
mining conditions."
The Court not only compared the sales but used the very word "comparison."
In an eminent domain case this would be prohibited.
Another significant statement appears in Lehigh Navigation Coal Com-
pany's Appeal" wherein Barnes, J. says at page 333:
"The legislature has prescribed market value as the standard for assess-
ment, and, of course, the prices paid in sales of similar properties constitute
the most easily applied standard for the determination of market value." 94
The quiet and peaceful existence of the tax assessment rule was rudely
shaken in 1946 in the decision of Felin v. Philadelphia" where the Court
applied the eminent domain rule prohibiting evidence of the selling prices
of similar properties on direct examination and allowing it only as to credi-
bility in cross-examination in a tax assessment case. The only authorities
cited were eminent domain cases. This "confusion of cases" was repeated
in 1949 in John Wanamaker, Philadelphia, Appeal.9"
That the legislature has no fear of having sales prices considered in tax
matters appears from the first two sentences of Sec. 8 of the Act of 1947
creating the State Tax Equalization Board:
"Immediately after its organization, the board shall accumulate and
compile data showing the prices at which real property in each school dis-
trict has been sold and all other available, relevant matter in any way having
a bearing on the market value of real property in the several school districts.
After such data has been compiled, the board shall add thereto, from time
to time, such additional data concerning new sales and improvements and
other data to the end that the records of the board shall 't all times show
the then present market value of real property in each school district as
nearly as the same can be determined." 97
Miscellaneous Cases
A number of trespass cases have considered the question of admitting
evidence of the prices at which the properties have been sold." Of the cases
93 327 Pa. 327, 193 At. 50 (1937).
94 See also as examples of cases on this point: Hart's Appeal, 131 Pa. Super. 104, 199 A.2d 225
(1938) and Allentown's Appeals, 147 Pa. Super. 385, 24 A.2d 109 (1942).
95 354 Pa. 317, 47 A.2d 227 (1946).
96 360 Pa. 638, 63 A.2d 349 (1949).
97 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 4656.8 (1947).
" Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. 102 (1883); Lentz v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 145 Pa.
612, 23 Atl. 219 (1891); Matteson v. N.Y. Central & H. R. R.R., 40 Pa. Super. 234 (1909);
Llewellyn v. Sunnyside Coal Co., 255 Pa. 291, 99 Atd. 869 (1917); Wissinger v. Valley Smokeless
Coal Co., 271 Pa. 566, 115 Atl. 880 (1922); Procz v. American Steel & Wire Co. of N.J., 318 Pa.
395, 178 Ati. 689 (1935).
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listed in the footnote, the Vanderslice, Lentz, Llewellyn, and Wissinger cases
have been cited numerous times in the eminent domain decisions. These cases
uniformly follow the eminent domain rules except that in the Procz case the
Court seemed to take purchase price into consideration in determining whether
or not the verdict was excessive.
In a statutory proceeding to fix the fair market value of premises sold
on the foreclosure of the mortgage" the Court said that the amount of an
offer to purchase, while it was unquestionably of evidentiary value, was not
conclusive of the fair value of the premises.
In a criminal prosecution where the value of certain land became
an issue it was held that the similar property sale, the price of which was
sought to be shown, was too remote.' 0 But the language of the Court seemed
to indicate that had it not been too remote it would have been allowed to go
toward showing value. In another criminal case' involving the value of
land the Commonwealth was permitted to show the prices at which certain
lands of the defendant had been sold by his assignees for the benefit of credi-
tors for the purpose of fixing the value of the said property, and further
allowed the defendant to prove the selling price of one of the same properties
on a resale in rebuttal. The Court further held that the selling price of similar
properties were properly rejected.
CONCLUSION
We have seen the following with regard to similar property sales: Con-
trary to the general rule prevailing elsewhere, Pennsylvania does not allow
evidence of similar property sales prices as going toward market value. It
may not be introduced on direct examination. This rule developed because
of an early aversion on the part of the Pennsylvania courts to introducing
collateral issues in this type of case and because of the peculiar substantive
definition of market value which declared market value to be the judgment
of the community or the general selling price, provable in much the same
fashion as reputation evidence. The latter reason probably no longer obtains
since the willing seller-willing buyer definition of market value now seems
secure in our judicial system. But a valuation witness may be asked on cross-
examination for the purpose of testing his credibility only as to the prices
99 349 Pa. 339, 37 A.2d 733 (1944).
1004 Pa. Super. 1 (1897).
101 14 Pa. Super. 352 (1900).
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of sales of which the witness had knowledge and upon which he based his
opinion of the value of the property involved in the instant case. However,
the term "based" is not a word of art and if the witness used the sale, or took
it into account, or considered it in forming his opinion he may be asked the
price that was paid. If the witness did not consider the sale in forming his
estimate of value he may be asked why he did not. It would seem that the
witness may also be required to compare, to a certain extent at any rate, the
property which is the subject of the inquiry and the property on which he
based his opinion. The extent of this line of inquiry will fall within the
discretion of the trial judge. In rebuttal or in its own case a party may show
that sales and the prices thereof considered by the adversary's witnesses were
based on a misapprehension of facts. Where prices are shown for several
properties in one lump sum, as in a deed, for instance, the other party is
entitled to show how the prices were apportioned to the several properties
included. And where one's witnesses are cross-examined as to prices, it is
proper in order to give the jury the full benefit of the basis of their opinion
to introduce the prices of other sales on redirect examination. The extent
of this inquiry will also fall within the discretion of the trial judge.
With regard to subject property sales, the following has 'been developed:
An owner may be cross-examined as to the purchase price he paid for his
property or as to offers or declarations of value or options or an agreement
of sale made by him for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of his testi-
mony or the integrity of his claim so long as the purchase, offer, declaration,
option or agreement is not too remote. And at least with regard to purchase
price, he need not have been a valuation witness to be subject to this cross-
examination. An agreement of sale entered into by a property owner at a
time and under circumstances not too remote from the date of valuation is
evidence going toward the determination of market value. The term remote-
ness refers not only to time but fo changes in conditions or fluctuations in the
market. However, an owner may not be cross-examined as to the price he
paid for his property even for its affect on his credibilty where a prop-
erty was exchanged for other property, or where two adjoining lots are merged
into one, or where the purchase was the result of a forced sale.
With regard to tax assessment cases we have seen the purchase price has
long been considered as having an important bearing on market value and
that the prices paid for similar properties in the neighborhood seem to have
been given the same effect by the Pennsylvania courts, but that the eminent
domain rule prohibiting proof of similar property sales prices as tending to
show value has begun to find its way into this area of the law.
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It is appropriate in concluding to consider an excerpt from the opinion
by the late Chief Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit in the case of the
U. S. v. 25. 406 acres of land, etc., in Arlington County, Virginia: 2
"In cases of this sort, we must never forget that the common sense of
the twelve men on the jury is a surer guaranty of justice than any attempt
that might be made to give logical application to antiquated rules of evidence.
If an honest and intelligent jury is given all the facts and is correctly in-
structed as to the law, it will come pretty near deciding a case correctly.
Artificial rules of evidence which exclude from the consideration of the
jurors matters which men consider in their everyday affairs hinder rather
than help them at arriving at a just result."
102 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1949).
